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PLENARY POWER IS DEAD!
LONG LIVE PLENARY POWER!
Michael Kagan *
For decades, scholars of immigration law have anticipated the demise of
the plenary power doctrine. The Supreme Court could have accomplished
this in its recent decision in Kerry v. Din, or it could have reaffirmed
plenary power. Instead, the Court produced a splintered decision that did
neither. This Essay examines the long process of attrition that has
significantly gutted the traditional plenary power doctrine with regard to
procedural due process, while leaving it largely intact with regard to
substantive constitutional rights.

June 15, 2015 could have been a momentous day in the evolution of
American immigration law. This was the day the Supreme Court announced
its decision in Kerry v. Din, 1 a case in which a U.S. citizen, Fauzia Din,
challenged the State Department’s refusal to grant a visa to her Afghan
husband, Kanishka Berashk, effectively refusing the couple the right to live
together. 2 Din argued that the visa denial infringed her right to marriage,
and as a matter of due process, the State Department owed her a specific
explanation for the decision. 3 The State Department had given no
explanation except for a vague reference to the statute banning people who
have engaged in terrorist activities from entering the United States. 4 Din did
not ask the Court to rule on whether her husband actually was a terrorist. 5
Rather, she asked for a process that would meaningfully allow the couple to
respond to the allegations. 6

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd
School of Law.
1. 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (plurality opinion).
2. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2131. For an explanation as to why the couple could not live
anywhere but in the United States, see Elizabeth Keyes, Symposium on Kerry v. Din: Another
Choiceless Choice, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (June 16, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com
/immigration/2015/06/symposium-on-kerry-v-din-another-choiceless-choice-by-elizabethkeyes.html [http://perma.cc/C5AU-A9LA].
3. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2131 (plurality opinion).
4. Id. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
5. See id. at 2132 (plurality opinion).
6. Id.
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Had Din won it would have been a very big deal. In fact, if she had won,
it might have been possible to state that the plenary power doctrine that has
long been the foundation of immigration law had finally been overruled.
That is because the federal government’s plenary authority to regulate
immigration free from judicial review or constitutional limitations was
usually assumed to be at its height when a noncitizen had not yet entered the
country. Sixty-five years ago, in Knauff v. Shaughnessy, the Court
(in)famously said: ‘‘[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is
due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.’’ 7 Ms. Din directly
challenged that premise, and she did it at a time when there was good reason
to wonder what was left of the plenary power doctrine.
Alas, Din did not win. She will not be reunited with her husband, at least
not by order of the Supreme Court. 8 Din’s defeat shows that plenary power is
not dead yet. But Din came very close, winning four Justices on the Court:
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Moreover, her challenge
severely divided the other five Justices, so much so that there is no
controlling decision in the case. 9 Only two Justices-----Justices Kennedy and
Alito-----used an analysis based on the plenary power doctrine as it has been
traditionally known in immigration law. 10 Yet, even they were willing to
assume for the sake of argument that Din was owed some measure of due
process. 11 The plurality opinion by Justice Scalia largely sidestepped the
Court’s immigration jurisprudence and focused instead on a critique of
substantive due process jurisprudence generally. 12
Thus, while Kerry v. Din was not a renunciation of the plenary power
doctrine, it was not a reaffirmation of the doctrine, either. 13 The case is
therefore an indication that the plenary power doctrine is indeed on fragile
jurisprudential ground and does not carry the force that it once did. The
Court’s decision in Kerry v. Din, moreover, is an indication that the Justices
find it difficult to entirely discard the plenary power doctrine and to fully
7. U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
8. Historically, some spouses of U.S. citizens who have been denied entry to the United
States on vague security grounds have later won entry through the political branches even after
losing their cases in the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and
Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
933 (1995) (profiling the people involved in the Knauff and Mezei cases).
9. See Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (plurality opinion).
10. See id. at 2139---41 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
11. See id. at 2139.
12. Id. at 2131---38 (plurality opinion).
13. Kevin Johnson, Limited Judicial Review of Consular Officer Visa Decisions----Foreshadowing the Result in the Same-Sex Marriage Case?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 15, 2015, 5:02
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/opinion-analysis-limited-judicial-review-ofconsular-officer-visa-decisions-foreshadowing-the-result-in-the-same-sex-marriage-case/
[http://perma.cc/4NES-CDW8] (‘‘[T]here was no ready defense of the doctrine of consular
non-reviewability and no aggressive invocation of cases contrary to modern constitutional
sensibilities such as Knauff and Mezei.’’).
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apply normal means of constitutional scrutiny to all aspects of immigration
law. The Justices may, however, be confused and divided about how to bring
the doctrine down for a gentle landing.
This Essay addresses the confusing current state of the plenary power
doctrine. I first summarize what this doctrine meant as it developed in the
late nineteenth century and evolved through most of the twentieth century. I
then outline reasons why recent case law has significantly weakened the
doctrine. I then suggest reasons why the Court may be hesitant to discard the
doctrine entirely. I conclude by suggesting paths that the Court may choose
to take going forward.
I. THE TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE
The original challenge of immigration law is that it is not explicitly one
of the enumerated constitutional powers of the federal government. In the
Chinese Exclusion Case in 1889, the Supreme Court reasoned that the
authority to regulate immigration is inherent in national sovereignty and the
national ‘‘right of self-preservation,’’ rather than stemming from any specific
constitutional provision. 14 Having chosen an extra-constitutional foundation
for immigration law, the Court quickly came to the conclusion that the
judiciary had little or no role in reviewing decisions prohibiting foreigners
from entering the country, 15 nor in reviewing decisions to arrest, detain, and
deport noncitizens who were already inside the country. 16
The result of this sweeping doctrine was that immigration law became ‘‘a
constitutional oddity’’ (in Professor Legomsky’s words), 17 largely immune
from the civil liberties revolution of the twentieth century. 18 By mid-century,
the Court was willing to approve indefinite detention of a would-be
immigrant on the theory that noncitizens had no due process rights,
especially when they were seeking entry. 19 However, this exceptional
approach had foundations that have become jurisprudentially questionable
in the twenty-first century. One was the court’s tendency to see immigration
authority as emanating from national sovereignty rather than from the
Constitution, which seemed to correspond to a reluctance to impose
constitutional constraints. Another was the nonrecognition of any due
process rights in immigration cases, based on the theory that immigration

14. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604--06, 608 (1889).
15. See, e.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892).
16. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 702 (1893).
17. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional
Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255.
18. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549 (1990).
19. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206.
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was a purely civil matter, and thus did not require the kinds of safeguards
that the Constitution expected in criminal cases. 20
II. RECENT CRACKS IN THE DOCTRINE
In 2001, the Supreme Court decided Zadvydas v. Davis, which presented
the question of whether the government could indefinitely detain deportable
noncitizens when the United States was unable to find another country
willing to take them. 21 Half a century earlier, the Court had affirmed
indefinite detention in somewhat similar circumstances. 22 But this time, the
Court found that the government’s immigration authority ‘‘is subject to
important constitutional limitations.’’ 23 The Court also found that even
deportable immigrants with serious criminal records have a ‘‘liberty interest
[that] is, at the least, strong enough to raise a serious question as to
whether . . . the Constitution permits detention that is indefinite and
potentially permanent.’’ 24 Even under a fairly narrow reading, Zadvydas
made clear that procedural due process concerns apply to immigration
enforcement, at least to the degree that immigration enforcement entails
deprivations of liberty. But it also opened up a broader question: What other
constitutional limitations might apply to immigration?
A significant reason why the Court has become more willing to apply
procedural due process appears to be that the Court has seen much less
significance in the formalistic civil-criminal distinction. The Court has
acknowledged that deportation could be worse than imprisonment for some
people, 25 such that the Sixth Amendment requires defendants in criminal
cases to be advised about immigration consequences of potential plea
agreements. 26 The Court has analogized pretrial detention in criminal cases
to pre-removal detention in immigration cases. 27 Whereas in the 1950s the
Court cited the civil-criminal distinction to interpret grounds of deportation
loosely, 28 the Court more recently has adopted a strict categorical approach
to criminal grounds of deportation, requiring the government to prove every

20. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730 (‘‘The order of deportation is not a punishment for
crime. . . . He has not, therefore, been deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law . . . .’’).
21. 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001).
22. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215---16.
23. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695.
24. Id. at 696.
25. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368
(2010).
26. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356.
27. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987).
28. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952).
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element of the deportation ground. 29 This change makes grounds of
deportation much more like offenses in a criminal statute.
Just as the Court has become more willing to find constitutional
limitations on immigration enforcement, it has also changed its conception
of the foundations of that power. The Court continues to hold that the
federal government has broad immigration authority, but it has more
recently rooted this authority in constitutionally enumerated powers,
specifically naturalization, foreign affairs, and the impact on commerce. 30
These two changes-----finding both a source and a limit for immigration law
in the Constitution-----push strongly toward normalizing immigration within
constitutional law. 31
One way to understand the traditional plenary power doctrine is that it
did not limit immigrant rights so much as it limited judicial review. 32 If this
is correct, then all that is required for immigration exceptionalism to end
would be for the Court to begin to review immigration cases against
established constitutional doctrines.
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Din may provide some indirect support for
this view. Justice Scalia did not rely on Knauff or any other plenary power
case. Instead, he questioned whether Din had presented a valid liberty
interest in the ‘‘right to live in the United States with her spouse.’’ 33 He
attacked the Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence. 34 There is no need
here to review the merits of Justice Scalia’s arguments. 35 The point is that
there is nothing about them that is unique to immigration. Most of Justice
Scalia’s opinion could have applied to any substantive due process cases in
which Justice Scalia might have a jurisprudential debate with the four liberal
Justices. Thus, in Din, the plurality appeared willing to debate an
immigrant’s fundamental rights (or lack thereof) on similar terms as any
other fundamental rights case. By contrast, Justice Kennedy explicitly cited
29. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013); Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980
(2015); see also Silva-Trevino, 26 I&N Dec. 550, 551 (A.G. 2015) (noting the shift to the
categorical approach).
30. E.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012).
31. Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and the Supreme Court, 2009---13: A New Era of
Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 67 OKL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (concluding that the
Roberts Court ‘‘has to a large extent continued to bring U.S. immigration law into the legal
mainstream’’).
32. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary
Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 SUP. CT. REV.
1, 33 (arguing that plenary power did not create alternative constitutional standards for
immigration but it restrained courts from reviewing immigration laws against established
constitutional norms).
33. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2131 (plurality opinion).
34. Id. at 2134---36.
35. For a critique of Justice Scalia’s narrowing of the right to marriage, see Michael
Kagan, Symposium on Kerry v. Din: Married, But Separated, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (June
18, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2015/06/symposium-on-kerry-vdin-married-but-separated-by-by-michael-kagan.html [http://perma.cc/JQ79-FG3E].

26

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

[Vol. 114:21

the plenary power doctrine to hold that courts should have a limited role in
reviewing decisions about granting noncitizens entry into the country. 36
Because of plenary power, Justice Kennedy thought it irrelevant whether Din
had a bona fide liberty interest. 37 But this exceptionalist view of immigration
attracted the support of only two Justices.
III. AND YET, PLENARY POWER LIVES ON
For Justice Kennedy, the most important precedent for Kerry v. Din was
the 1972 decision in Kleindienst v. Mandel, in which the Supreme Court
affirmed the government’s authority to refuse a visa to a Belgian journalist
who described himself as ‘‘a revolutionary Marxist,’’ and who had been
invited to speak at American universities. 38 The Court acknowledged that
the visa denial impacted freedom of speech and thus allowed that a minimal
form of judicial review should apply. 39 But Mandel required the government
only to state a ‘‘facially legitimate and bona fide’’ basis for the visa denial, 40
which is a far lower level of scrutiny than would apply in a free speech
infringement case outside the immigration context. 41 Justice Kennedy would
have extended this logic to infringements on other fundamental rights, such
as the right to marriage. 42 Like the Court in Mandel, Justice Kennedy
expressed fear the courts could be dragged into every case in which the
government found a person inadmissible and would be asked to balance the
would-be immigrant’s interests against the interests of that of the United
States. 43
It would be tempting to view Mandel as applying only to visa requests
from outside the country. But it is not entirely clear that this explains the
Court’s decisions in which fundamental rights conflict with immigration
enforcement decisions. In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee, the Court allowed Congress to foreclose selective enforcement as
a defense against deportation of noncitizens inside the United States, even if
a noncitizen could show that the government was using deportation to
suppress unpopular political views. 44 As a result, it may be a fair reading to
suggest that the Court has departed from the traditional plenary power
36. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139---40 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 2140.
38. 408 U.S. 753, 756---57 (1972).
39. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770.
40. See id.
41. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (‘‘Content-based laws----those that target speech based on its communicative content-----are presumptively
unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly
tailored to serve compelling state interests.’’).
42. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139---41 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 2140---41
44. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
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doctrine on matters of procedural due process for noncitizens inside the
United States but that the Court has not yet been willing to apply substantive
constitutional rights to immigration law. 45
Why might the Court be reluctant to do this? Cases about free speech,
like Mandel and American-Arab, raise the specter of the government being
forced to tolerate noncitizens with threatening political views. 46 Usually,
however, it is only a minority of immigrants who come as political activists.
It is far more common for immigrants to come for family reasons. Thus,
Din’s claim had far greater implications. Once the Court recognizes that
immigration exclusions must bend to a citizen’s right to marriage, other
questions would follow. For one thing, Congress places a quota on spousal
unification visas for spouses of legal permanent residents. 47 Is their right to
marriage equivalent to that of citizens, and is the quota thus invalid? What
about other types of family members on which Congress has imposed a
quota? Do these policies pose a constitutional problem? Even more
provocative questions are raised if the Court were to apply the Equal
Protection Clause to immigration. Among other things, Congress has
imposed a per country quota on family-based immigration. 48 In practice, this
means that some Mexican families must wait thirteen years longer than
similarly situated families of other nationalities. 49 Does this pass
constitutional muster? The Supreme Court has avoided these questions by
resisting applying substantive rights to immigration entirely.
CONCLUSION
A sober observer would point out that immigration law scholars have
been predicting the imminent demise of the plenary power doctrine for at
least three decades. 50 In 1995, Legomsky wrote an essay reassessing his own
predictions for the rapid and dramatic demise of the plenary power. He
wrote:
45. See Johnson, supra note 31 (observing that plenary power remains intact with regard
to substantive rights).
46. See Carrie Rosenbaum, Symposium on Kerry v. Din: Kerry v. Din as a Troubling
‘‘Terrorism’’ and ‘‘National Security’’ Case, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (June 18, 2015),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2015/06/symposium-on-kerry-v-din-kerry-vdin-as-a-troubling-terrorism-and-national-security-case-by-carrie-r.html
[http://perma.cc/4DS3-JFFJ].
47. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c) (2014) (establishing worldwide numerical limitations on
family-sponsored immigration).
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (2014) (setting per country levels of immigration).
49. See Visa Bulletin for July 2015, U.S. DEP’T OF ST., (June 9, 2015),
http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/law-and-policy/bulletin/2015/visa-bulletin-forjuly-2015.html [http://perma.cc/H59T-7788] (depicting differential wait times for most
nationalities and those subject to the per country quota).
50. E.g., Legomsky, supra note 17, at 305 (predicting that the Court would ‘‘conclude
that the time has come to lay the general principle to rest’’); Motomura, supra note 18, at 547--48 (describing disappointment after the plenary power doctrine was critiqued in the 1980s but
continued).
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I expected the dam to burst with a sudden, dramatic
announcement that, henceforth, immigration cases would be
treated like any other cases. . . . Obviously, that has not
happened. . . . [However], a different scenario seems to be in
progress already. Under this revised scenario, the lower courts
and the Supreme Court allow the plenary power doctrine to wear
away by attrition. Little by little, exceptions and qualifications will
reduce the doctrine to a shadow of its former self without an
express overruling of contrary precedent. 51

Twenty years after that was written, we can note significant progress in
this war of attrition. On questions of procedural due process, plenary power
is indeed a shadow of its former self. The Court’s acknowledgement that the
stakes in a deportation case are at least as high as the stakes in a criminal
case, coupled with the Court’s recognition in Zadvydas that noncitizens have
a liberty interest in avoiding detention, provide ample foundation for a topto-bottom reassessment of whether the routine procedures of immigration
enforcement meet due process standards. Recently, lower courts have shown
increasing discomfort with the routine ways in which noncitizens are
arrested and detained without an independent finding of probable cause. 52
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has extended Zadvydas to
establish a right to a bond hearing for lengthy prehearing detention of people
facing removal, even when the Immigration and Nationality Act imposes
mandatory detention. 53 In Din, six Justices were willing to assume that even
a noncitizen outside the country might have a claim to at least some due
process.
We still must wait to see if the Court will push this due process
revolution to its logical conclusion, and fully treat immigration cases for
purposes of procedural due process like any other matter with similarly high
stakes. But even if the Court reaches that remarkable threshold regarding
questions of procedure, plenary power will remain intact with regard to the
substance of immigration law. In immigration, Congress remains free to
discriminate by nationality and by political opinion. Our seminal plenary
power case-----the Chinese Exclusion Case-----is known by its explicitly racist
title. Not only has it never been repudiated by the Court, we have no case law
51. Stephen Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and
the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 925, 934 (1995).
52. See generally Michael Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment
Problem, 104 GEO. L. J. (forthcoming 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2568903 [http://
perma.cc/3YRL-L9KT].
53. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1137---38 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that
Zadvydas requires a bond hearing once pre-order detention lasts beyond six months); CasasCastrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 950 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that prolonged
detention while a respondent petitions in federal court for review of a removal order requires a
bond hearing); see generally Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory
Immigration Detention, 65 HASTINGS L. J. 363 (2014).
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suggesting that the original Chinese Exclusion Act is constitutionally
problematic. To reach such a conclusion, the Court would have to be willing
to apply Equal Protection analysis to the substance of immigration law, and
that would potentially raise questions about the validity of a great deal of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.
Clearly, there are already four Justices who are ready to apply
fundamental rights in the context of immigration. If the Court eventually
takes that step, it will face a choice. It could declare broadly that substantive
constitutional rights apply in immigration. That would cause the dam to
break, to borrow Legomsky’s phrase. But history counsels us not to expect
this. Instead, the Court may be more likely to take one small substantive
right at a time, much the way the Court began applying the Bill of Rights to
the states. 54 In a sense, the Court already started this process, by announcing
in Zadvydas that noncitizens have a constitutionally protected right to
liberty. The question is, what else do they have a right to?
Expect the war of attrition to continue.

54. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.
J. 1193, 1195 (1992) (‘‘A list of cases applying various parts of the Bill of Rights against states
reads like the ‘‘greatest hits’’ of the modern era . . . .’’).
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